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Alexander v. Sandoval:
A Setback for Civil Rights
Kevin G. Welner
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract 
This article confronts the serious implications of a recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Alexander v. Sandoval, which eliminated an important 
legal avenue for civil rights plaintiffs. For over 35 years, individuals
have been allowed to bring lawsuits directly challenging violations of
rights set forth in the federal regulations implementing Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Because these actions could be grounded in proof
of disparate impact, rather than discriminatory intent, they allowed for
some claims that could not go forward under other legal authorities, such
as the Fourteenth Amendment. While the author concludes by
identifying key remaining options, he highlights the real damage done by
this decision.
        I recently had occasion to remember a meeting three years ago with Richard Cohen,
the legal director of the Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, Alabama. At that
meeting, he told me about his lawsuit on behalf of Martha Sandoval, a house cleaner
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from Mobile and a Mexican immigrant. Ms. Sandoval was denied a drivers' license
because she could not pass the state's written exam. The voters of Alabama had passed
an English-Only law, and the state interpreted that law to require that drivers' license
exams be offered only in English (the only state with such a limitation). While Ms.
Sandoval's working knowledge of English was sufficient to read road signs, it was not
sufficient to take the exam. 
        Mr. Cohen brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Sandoval and the 24,000
other non-English speakers in Alabama, alleging that the state violated federal law by
requiring applicants for drivers' licenses to take the written examination in English. The
particular federal law that supported this lawsuit is known as Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)). Title VI prohibits discrimination grounded in race,
color or national origin.
        Like the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, Title VI has been
judicially interpreted to require proof of discriminatory intent. Proof limited to
discriminatory effect, such as is clearly evident with the Alabama law, is insufficient.
Yet, while courts have interpreted the statute itself to bar only intentional discrimination,
federal regulations implementing Title VI, pursuant to § 602 of the statute, have been
consistently given a broader interpretation (see regulations at 34 C.F.R. §100.3(b)(2)).
Lawsuits grounded in these implementing regulations are unique in that they allow
people like Ms. Sandoval to make their arguments in federal court by showing the
discriminatory effect (“disparate impact”) of a law. This brief article is about such Title
VI disparate impact lawsuits and April's Supreme Court decision against Martha
Sandoval, in Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (2001), eliminating the right of Ms.
Sandoval and all others to pursue lawsuits directly enforcing the Title VI regulations. 
        Intent versus effect—what's the difference? After all, the worst discrimination is
surely intentional. The SPLC, for instance, has built an impressive record of court
victories on behalf of victims of such egregious racism. These cases target the KKK and
neo-Nazi organizations. The defendants are abhorrent, and the issue of racist intent
cannot be seriously questioned. Further, we as a society do not want to encourage
frivolous lawsuits grounded only in a statistically disproportionate effect on some
minority group. What is the harm of limiting lawsuits to only those where discriminatory
intent is clear? 
        In a nutshell, policy makers today, no matter what their actual intent, are loath to
expressly state an intent to discriminate. Even the English Only law that prompted Ms.
Sandoval's lawsuit was likely promoted on facially neutral grounds such as unity,
assimilation, and even fiscal efficiency. Within certain limits, policies that have a clear
discriminatory impact should be closely scrutinized, and the government should have to
offer reasonable justifications for them, even if there exists no smoking gun
demonstrating an intent to discriminate. This is how courts approached Title VI
disparate impact cases before April's Supreme Court decision. While the person bringing
the case must prove that the practice in question has a disproportionate and negative
impact on a protected group, the defendant (e.g., a state government or a school district)
can then respond by demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
practice (see Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999); 34 C.F.R. §100.3(b)(2)).
Frivolous lawsuits therefore fail either because of a lack of proof of disproportionate
negative impact or because of an appropriate, nondiscriminatory reason for the practice. 
        In Ms. Sandoval's case, the SPLC lawyers easily proved that the drivers' license rule
had the prohibited effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin. Given that
illiterate residents who could nonetheless understand spoken English were allowed to
take the Alabama drivers' license exam in spoken form (with someone reading them the
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questions in English), the state could not justify denying residents like Ms. Sandoval the
opportunity to take the written exam in a form that they could understand. The trial court
agreed with Ms. Sandoval, as did the court of appeals. Normally, this would have been
the end of the matter. 
        But attorneys for the State of Alabama took one last shot. They asked the U.S.
Supreme Court to declare that Congress never intended private individuals to be able to
bring lawsuits directly under the authority of the Title VI implementing regulations. The
Court agreed to hear the case, and on April 24, 2001 they reversed the judgment. By a
5-4 majority in Alexander v. Sandoval (the same breakdown of individual Justices
deciding in favor of George W. Bush in Bush v. Gore), the Court concluded that
Congress only intended these regulations to be directly enforceable by the Office of
Civil Rights—a political body with very limited resources—not by a private right of
action. 
        The Court's decision even to consider this case was shocking. In the 37 years since
the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the Court has several times given a tacit nod of
approval to the now-forbidden private actions. Moreover, the issue of private actions
brought under the Title VI regulations had been decided by 9 of the 12 U.S. Courts of
Appeals, and there was no dispute: all agreed that such an action is legally appropriate.
The Supreme Court will rarely hear a case addressing legal issues about which there
exists no dispute among the various Courts of Appeals. Yet this Court reached out to
hear the case. 
        The fallout from Alexander is potentially enormous. For instance, in New York,
ACLU attorneys may not be able to continue their Title VI action claiming that
educational opportunities for the state's minority students are so inferior that they
amount to discrimination. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, Philadelphia may have to dismiss
its Title VI claim alleging that the Pennsylvania funding formula disparately impacts
districts with higher minority enrollments. Dozens of other important civil rights cases
will suffer a similar fate. 
        For these reasons, the Court's decision in Alexander comes as a great
disappointment. While expectations for the present Supreme Court may be low, courts
as an institution play a crucial role in our constitutional system. American courts,
particularly federal courts, once represented a refuge for children seeking access to
educational opportunities. While the legislative and executive branches were responsive
to those who sought policies expanding local control, pushing for tougher standards, or
enhancing individual choice, the judicial branch served the interests of equity. Civil
rights groups leveraged court mandates into broader, equity-minded educational policy
reforms benefiting, among others, African Americans, Latinos, immigrants, and students
with disabilities. Over the past two to three decades, litigation has undoubtedly been a
less successful tool for social justice. Yet this shift, partially attributable to a
corresponding shift in judges' ideologies, need not be permanent; the judiciary retains its
unique institutional position as protector of the constitutional rights of political
minorities. 
        The gloomy picture painted by the above description of Alexander and its probable
aftermath should be tempered by the reality that, for better or worse, many judges'
decisions in civil rights cases are grounded as much in their understanding of what is
“fair” as in the specific elements of the legal claim for relief then at issue. From this
perspective, what is important is that civil rights cases must find a legal toehold—some
legislative justification to have the case considered. While the useful toehold provided
by the implied right of action under the Title VI implementing regulations has now
disappeared, other options remain. 
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        The most likely alternative course for future private actions may be offered by
Section 1983 (of Title 42 of the U.S. Code), the reconstruction era legislation that
authorizes lawsuits against the government or government officials responsible for the
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” The implementing regulations for Title VI may fall within the scope of Section
1983's protections. Actions brought under § 1983 bypass the increasingly difficult
implied right of action analysis. Congress expressly intended § 1983 to give civil rights
plaintiffs access to the direct judicial relief. 
        In fact, the Pennsylvania funding case mentioned above includes a disparate impact
claim for relief, under the terms of Title VI's implementing regulations, based on § 1983
(Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d at 400-403). See also, Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to
Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. Kans. L. Rev 321 (2001) (arguing that
§ 1983 should support private rights of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations
issued pursuant to § 602). In the perhaps overly optimistic words of Justice Stevens
(dissenting) in Alexander, “[T]his case is something of a sport. Litigants who in the
future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must
only reference § 1983 to obtain relief.” 121 S.Ct. at 1527. 
        Another alternative would be to turn to Congress for legislation that would return
Title VI jurisprudence to its pre-Alexander state, as has been done with the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1991 following the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing 
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). But such remedial legislation seems unlikely be
approved by Congress or signed by the President in the near future. 
        During my meeting with Richard Cohen of the SPLC, we discussed the importance
of responding to systemic denials of educational rights with lawsuits that employ
systemic legal approaches. When he argued Ms. Sandoval's case before the Supreme
Court, he tried to protect one such systemic approach. The Supreme Court's decision to
undermine Title VI unquestionably represents a severe setback for children seeking
schooling opportunities. Eventually, the education rights community will be able to
recover from this blow, but this will take time and the opportunity costs will be high.
Instead of working to advance the cause of equal rights beyond its present state,
advocates will have to devote their energies to repairing the damage incurred last week.
In the meantime, many aggrieved students and others will find themselves without
sufficient remedies. 
        The Court's decision in Alexander was much more than a legal abstraction; it marks
a poignant shift in how Americans are allowed to treat one another.
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